The value of a good science education

In his Reference Frame commentary, Leo Kadanoff calls attention to published data showing that US high-school students have mediocre achievement test scores in science and related subjects in comparison with other nations (PHYSICS TODAY, September 2006, page 8). To help alleviate the problem, he advocates measures to improve the effectiveness of teacher training.

However, there is a compelling reason to question one aspect of Kadanoff's analysis of causes. The factors he cites are presented as persistent aspects of culture—characteristics of our way of life that he sees as dating back for generations. If those factors had been operative for so long, how could we ever have achieved a position of leadership in science? Since the concern at hand is potential or ongoing loss of leadership, the mere presence of these or other persistent causes cannot be the primary explanation. Either additional impediments to learning have emerged or cultural change has intensified the established impediments. I suggest that we examine the accelerating, ongoing cultural change in the US over the past several decades and that we focus on the core change that impacts science most severely: The nation has shifted in philosophy from the search for truth to the postmodern denial that objective truth exists.¹

Science faculty may feel secure against the threat of postmodernism because they have the authority to instruct concerning the facts of nature—facts that exist independent of opinions and beliefs. Unfortunately, many students arrive in science classrooms and laboratories already committed to the postmodern conception of truth as culturally determined, multiple valued, and continuously subject to undisciplined debate and modification. They are consequently unprepared mentally to accept instruction that conflicts with the postmodern viewpoint. As long as postmodernism continues its onward march, this problem can only grow worse.

Kadanoff says the conflict that science has with religion over evolution is a source of both disinterest and hostility toward science. A more complete analysis would address all the major factors that influence the standing of science in society; one factor, I think, is science's growing complacency about its own reputation for objectivity. Kadanoff characterized that reputation as follows: "[Scientific] observations can provide the hard facts upon which others may build the reliable instruments of our polity, or our economy, or our view of the world." Complacency about science's reputation takes two forms: accepting ideological influences that conflict with objectivity and drawing on the reputation of science to advance policy preferences.

One example of ideological influence is addressed in the work of Karl Reinhard of the University of Nebraska. He describes the adverse impact that the American counterculture of the 1960s and 1970s had on the archaeological and anthropological study of pre-Columbian civilization in North America²—an impact that included publication of invalid conclusions that were accepted uncritically because they supported the sociopolitical views of the scholars and their students. Conflicting results were excluded from consideration, thereby delaying for many years the recognition and correction of bias.

Science institutions and leaders also harm science's reputation for objectivity by endorsing specific policy preferences and participating in institutional alliances intended to advance the endorsed preferences. To sustain the claim of objectivity, science should avoid institutional policy endorsement, emphasize those "hard facts," maintain a clear distinction between facts and policy recommendations, acknowledge other interests and sources of knowledge as legitimate, and treat other parties engaged in policy discussion with respect rather than condescension. Unwillingness to accept these limitations is evident in debate concerning highly contested policy areas, such as nuclear proliferation, ballistic missile defense, and global warming. Science pays the consequent price of its activism in the form of diminished respect.

References

1. 1. A. Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind, Simon & Shuster, New York (1987).
2. 2. K. Reinhard, Am. Sci. 94, 254 (2006) .

Although we agree with the larger point Leo Kadanoff makes—that in this country educational and intellectual accomplishments are insufficiently valued compared with other types of success—we believe that his criticism of The Wizard of Oz as an example of an anti-education attitude in American culture is unfounded.

Kadanoff complains that in the movie, "one character morphs from nasty schoolteacher into wicked witch. Another is given a diploma to make up for his lack of brain." However, the occupation of Miss Gulch, the character who morphs into the Wicked Witch, is not even mentioned in the film. The only clue to her background comes from Auntie Em, who tells her, "Almira Gulch, just because you own half the county doesn't mean you have the power to run the rest of us!" It sounds like wealthy landowners are the ones being cast in a bad light, not schoolteachers.

Regarding the Wizard's gift of a diploma to the Scarecrow, who asked him for a brain, we note that the Wizard also gave a medal to the Lion, who asked him for courage, and a heart-shaped watch to the Tin Man, who asked him for a heart. Are we therefore to infer that the film devalues courage and love as well as intelligence? Certainly not. On the contrary, all the quests of Dorothy's companions are portrayed as noble and worthwhile.

When presenting gifts to Dorothy's companions, the Wizard tells each recipient that he is not really lacking what he seeks. That is certainly true of the Scarecrow, who bemoans his lack of a brain and yet comes up with most of the good ideas for Dorothy's group. The purpose of the Wizard's gifts is to provide some recognition of each one's abilities in order to build self-confidence. The message conveyed is that you don't need the help of a wizard with magical powers to be successful; you can do that on your own if you simply have some faith in yourself and make good use of whatever abilities you have. That's one of the cherished ideals of American culture—and hardly an anti-educational one.

Leo Kadanoff's column on physics education follows several recent PHYSICS TODAY articles on improving education in physics. The programs and proposals seem meritorious, and I've appreciated being able to contribute a small part to helping start the new Physical Review journal on physics education research. But it seems to me there's a more fundamental problem than just the improvement of the way we teach: How do we make physics a subject that more people want to learn about?

The discoveries and accomplishments of physics in the early 20th century were awe inspiring, and their promise surely contributed to the growth of our field. So did the Manhattan Project, the Apollo space program, and similar major engineering efforts. My pursuit of physics largely stemmed from an early exposure to the Moon landings and the inspiration they provided to explore new things. But those things are now past, part of the legacy of our science. Somehow the promise and inspiration has been lost in physics, and we have to compete with the information and biological sciences that now seem much more open to exploration and wonder.

Kadanoff's statement on "meaning and value," while accurate, illustrates the current situation: "Evidence-based arguments aimed at finding provisional truths" isn't exactly the siren call that will bring millions of eager and enthusiastic students. The argument that students should learn physics because it's good for them seems to me to parallel the old argument to keep teaching classical Latin—it may have a point, but it's doomed. In a world that has computers as stores of knowledge, ready calculators of even the most complex formulas, and prominent physicists who claim that robots are better space explorers than humans, the future for human exploration in the physical sciences seems strikingly limited. Can we do better to convey the open vistas that still do exist in the physical sciences? Or must we await the next set of revolutions comparable to those of the 20th century before broad public enthusiasm for our science can be rekindled?